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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900081-CA

v.
Category No. 2

TERRY WAYNE PERDUE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in the
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) after a jury trial in the Third
Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

this appeal which has been poured over from the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant cannot claim instructional error

for the first time on appeal where he failed below to state a
specific objection to the trial court's use of his own requested
jury instructions?

Objections to jury instructions must be

specific and in the record, absent manifest injustice.
Crim. P. 19(c).

Utah R.

However, appellate courts will not review a

claim of manifest injustice when counsel "affirmatively led the
trial court to believe that nothing was wrong with the
instruction."

State v. Medina

738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).

2.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict

defendant of murder in the second degree instead of manslaughter?
An appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the jury's verdict, and will overturn the conviction only if
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c).
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects
thereto
before
the
jury
is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. Notwithstanding a parties failure
to object, error may be assigned
to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(Supp.

1989)

(R. 6-7).

Defendant was

convicted

as charged

following a jury trial on October 2-4, 1989 in the Third Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding
(R. 25). Judge Noel sentenced defendant to serve a term of five
years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 145-46; 179, p. 8).
Additionally, Judge Noel enhanced defendant's sentence for use of
a firearm in the commission of the crime by imposing a sentence
of zero to five years to run consecutively with defendant's
sentence for second degree murder (R. 146; 179, p. 8 ) .
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the late afternoon of October 18, 1988, defendant
received a telephone call from the victim, Jerry Kadell Hermansen
(T. 88-89, 104, 174, 185).

Hermansen asked defendant to pick

him up at a bar in Sandy and give him a ride (T. 88, 105, 112).
Hermansen had traded rides for cocaine in the past (T. 182).
When defendant arrived, Hermansen indicated he had to
retrieve a pillowcase from a nearby building (T. 89, 185). After
Hermansen

retrieved

the

pillowcase,

he

showed

defendant

the

contents—a revolver, a buck knife, and some ammunition (T. 89,
113, 185). Hermansen suggested that they use the gun for target
practice (T. 90, 115, 186-87).

He also suggested they share some

cocaine in his possession (T. 105, 186).

In order to fire the

revolver, they decided to travel to the area near the Salt Lake
City dump (T. 89, 186-87).
Enroute, defendant and Hermansen started to argue about
a supposed drug debt defendant owed to Hermansen (T. 90, 117,
187)

When they arrived at the dump, defendant and Hermansen

snorted

Hermansen's

cocaine—defendant

snorting

two

lines of

cocaine, Hermansen snorting six (T. 189, 190). Hermansen wanted
defendant to obtain more cocaine (T. 190).
Id.

Defendant refused.

After they had fired some shots, they started arguing again,

with Hermansen

demanding

that defendant

pay his debt.

Id.

Hermansen took the keys out of the ignition and told defendant he
The facts leading to Hermansen's death come primarily from
defendant's post-Miranda statement to Salt Lake Police Detective
Donald Bell and defendant's own testimony at trial (T. 85-130,
176-223).
The State takes no position on the veracity of these
statements.
-3-

would keep the car in lieu of the debt or until the debt was
repaid (T. 90-91, 118, 191, 192-93).
Hermansen had the gun and was reloading it during the
argument (T. 117, 118, 193, 194).

Defendant watched Hermansen

load three bullets into the gun (T. 91, 194)

Defendant demanded

that Hermansen return the keys (T. 195-96).

Hermansen refused

(T. 196). Considering himself in danger, defendant hit Hermansen
with his fist and took the revolver (T. 91, 119, 196, 197-98).
At this point, defendant's version of events starts to
differ between his statement
trial.

to police and his testimony at

According to his police statement, Hermansen took the

knife out and lunged at defendant
struck

the

car

(T.

92).

(T. 87, 91-92).

Defendant

held

The knife

Hermansen's

hand

containing the knife in one hand as they struggled (T. 92, p.
120).

They fell to the ground and the gun discharged.

Id.

Hermansen again lunged at defendant, defendant closed his eyes
and fired again twice (T. 93, 120-21).

Then, according to the

police statement, defendant threw the gun into the Jordan River
(T. 93).
In reality, defendant

gave the gun to his

cocaine

supplier in return for $20.00 worth of cocaine (T. 54-57).
brought the gun to her wrapped in a towel (T. 55).

He

The knife,

according to Salt Lake Police Officer John Johnson, was found
folded in Hermansen's pocket (T. 33).

The gun was ultimately

retrieved and ballistics tests verified that the gun recovered
fired the shots which killed Hermansen (T. 73, 76).
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At trial, defendant gave a different version of events.
After hitting Hermansen, defendant

fell on top of Hermansen,

pinning Hermansen's legs with his hip (T. 198).

The gun was in

Hermansen's left hand with defendant's hand over Hermansen's.
Id.
hip.

Somehow in the struggle, the gun fired hitting Hermansen's
Id.

Nonetheless, Hermansen jumped up and advanced toward

defendant who closed his eyes and fired two shots, one hitting
Hermansen in the neck (T. 198-99).

The fight ended in a matter

of seconds (T. 200).
Defendant

threw

the

gun

on

the

seat

of

the

car,

retrieved the keys from Hermansen, and dragged him to the side of
the road (T. 200, 208-09, 217). In a panic, defendant drove away
(T. 200). Two cartridges remained in Hermansen's right hand (T.
208).

Defendant admitted

shooting

(T.

201).

lying to police officers about the

Defendant

claimed

he

did

not

want

to

implicate his cocaine dealer (T. 202, 211).
Defendant also testified that he did not think he could
claim

self-defense

in

Utah

(T. 201).

However, when

being

questioned by Detective Bell, defendant discussed self-defense
with the detective (T.96, 107). After this discussion, defendant
admitted

to Detective Bell that an earlier statement to the

police had been incorrect (T. 108).

Defendant told Detective

Bell that he felt he had to fight since Hermansen had the gun and
only five bullets were left (T. 119).

However, defendant only

mentioned the knife after the police asked him about it (T. 124).
Defendant also admitted initiating the fight (T. 126).
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Defendant

admitted

at

trial

that

he

had

lied

Detective Bell and other police officers (T. 201, 202-03).

to
He

claimed that he decided to admit his responsibility after talking
with his wife (T. 203). On cross-examination, defendant admitted
that

there had

been

no prior

incidents

of violence

between

himself and Hermansen and he characterized Hermansen as a friend
(T. 205-06).

He admitted Hermansen had never pointed the gun at

him and that the cylinder of the gun was open.

(T. 214-15).

Hermansen never told defendant he was going to shoot him, nor did
Hermansen threaten defendant with violence, although they were
both getting ready to fight (T. 215, 218).
punches (T. 218).

Hermansen threw no

After shooting Hermansen, defendant neither

checked his victim to see if he was alive, nor did he tell
anybody what had happened (T. 217, 218).
At trial,

Assistant State Medical Examiner, Sharon

Schnittker, testified about Hermansen's wounds and cause of death
(T. 130-68).

Dr. Schnittker testified that she performed the

Hermansen autopsy (T. 132). As part of her autopsy, she went to
the scene of the killing.

Id,.

Hermansen's sweatshirt had entry

and exit wounds consistent with a shot to the chest (T. 134).
Hermansen's

jeans had a hole consistent with a back to front

gunshot (T. 134-35).

Abrasions to Hermansen's skull could have

been caused by either a fall or a blunt object (T. 136).
body had other abrasions as well (T. 136-37).

His

No tattooing or

stippling was found on Hermansen's body or clothes

(T. 140).

Tattooing

gunpowder

and

stippling

consists

burning into the skin or clothing.
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of

particles

Id.

of

Because there was no

tattooing ox stippling, all the shots would have to be fjLred t ,1 om
more than fourteen inches away.

Id.

He m a n sen Iia 1! received three gunshot wounds, which Or,
Schnittker arbitrarily labeled as #] (l #2 1( and #3 ( I

1 3 7)

WniiniJ

#] was fired! into the right side of the neck, slightly downward/
and ex I ted
chord,

t:l ICE • ]

][d.

perpendicular

The
plane

Il * -" "
bullet

'
"•

t IIH '

-raveled

of Hermansen's

i rough

almost
body

about

angle

Crotti I lie f

total

paralysis from the neck down, collapse,

and death

I "Ul j

at

parallel

to

a 30

the

degree

Tlii » wruifid w o n I •

- •-.

unconsciousness,

1

(T. 14 0-4

t I mi J

1 1 j i li

I( j I

<-; j i )i >

i 11

t !h^J

i lit1 ^ I

. .ie: exited the left front side of the chest

and entered Hermansen o elbow.

Id.

If Hermansen was standing

upright when shot, the bu.1 l e t t r a v e l e d p a r a l l e l
141).

the spinal

Wound

tn I In-' t luoi

#3 entered the back of the left hip.

^Id.

| T" .
Dr.

Schi :i :i ttker described it as a straight shot from the rear (T. 14142) .
Defense

counsel

stipulated

deteiriTti ii'ia I; IUIII oil I llif iHiit ,
(T. 143)
144).

Wound 4 - a 1111

HKJt

w\ inJ i ,i\.\

the

pathologist' s

points of Hermansen's
i } exited

wounds

in 1:1 le f it: on t (T

No determination was made whether Hermansen was standing

o
could not have fired the shot whic
Hermansen's body was discovered
(

t ::>

However,

Hermansen

wounded his hip

('[', 148).

the morning after the shooting

Prior to trial, both the prosecutor and defense counsel
submitted proposed jury instructions to the trial court (R. 4657, 59-94).

Among defendant's proposed jury instructions were

instructions on reasonable doubt and self-defense (R. 59, 94).
(See Appendices
doubt

and

M M

A

H

and

self-defense

C")

Defendant's proposed reasonable

instructions

were

identical

to

the

instructions given by the trial court at the close of the trial
(R. 114, 129).

(See Appendices

"B" and

"D")

Nonetheless,

defense counsel objected to the use of his reasonable doubt
instruction at trial (T. 281).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant requested both of the jury instructions he
now challenges on appeal.

This Court should decline to consider

defendant's claim of instructional error because he invited the
claimed error.

Allowing defendant to challenge his own jury

instructions on appeal is procedurally unjustified and viewed by
appellate

courts

Additionally,

both

the

Utah

in Utah
Rules

and
of

elsewhere

Criminal

with

disfavor.

Procedure

require

defendant to specifically state his grounds for objecting to the
jury instructions at trial.

Defendant did not do so, relying

instead on a vague, conclusive statement with no basis in law.
The basis for the objection must be distinctly stated absent
manifest injustice.

However, since defendant initially proposed

the allegedly erroneous jury instructions, no manifest injustice
can occur.
The jury had sufficient evidence to convict defendant
of murder in the second degree.

No dispute exists that defendant
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killed the victim, the only question is whether defendant had the
requisite culpable mental state for second degree murder.

The

State presented evidence that tie t en da i it shut the viet im Twice in
the back and once in the side

A reasonable jury could accept

the evidence as either proof of defendant's intent to kill the
victim or, alternatively, i intending to cause serious bodily harm
leading to the victim's death
to believe

defendant's

The jury was under no obligation

version

of events

presented

HL trial,

particularly since defendant had admittedly 2 ied to the po] i ce,
Since

there

was reasonable

evidence

to support

defendant, s

ronv i rt i on , t h 1 s P< HIT f shnu 111 „i f i n in defenda n1 " s ronv i cf 11 m
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H I S C 0 U R T S H 0 U L D N Q T CONSIDER DEFENDANT S
JURY INSTRUCTION CHALLENGE.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT REQUESTED THE
CHALLENGED JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR.
Defendant challenges two jury instructions given by the
t i i d 1 I i. HI r I

Si i IC e defei idai I t: :i : eques ted bo tl i ::: f tl i€ :::;1 ia] lenged

instructions , tl :i I s Court

should

summarily

reject

his argument

based on *}~ doctrine of "invited error."
11

11jpi e n t t j

I i Mir I

S i i 11]

mi in

iiii

Ihei

ml oxf ,

" [W]e reemphasize this Court's past decisions wherein w e stated
that 'invited error' is procedural]y unjustified and viewed with
State v. Tillman
The Court recently explained,
defendant
implant

).
'To rule otherwise would permit a

criminal case to 'invite' prejudicial error and
record as a form, of appellate insurance against
-9-

an adverse sentence."

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285

(Utah 1989).
In

the

present

case,

defendant

implanted

instructional error to which he now complains.

the

Prior to trial,

defendant submitted a packet of jury instructions to the trial
court (R. 58-94).

Among the instructions submitted by defendant

was an instruction on reasonable doubt and another on selfdefense (R. 59, 94).

(See Appendices "A" and

M

C M ) . The trial

court gave both instructions to the jury (R. 114, 129).

(See

Appendices "B" and "D"). Defendant now complains that the trial
court used both of his instructions.
As the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, a strong policy
reason exists for not allowing a defendant to complain about jury
instructions he drafted.

"If we would condone the action of a

party whereby he offers and obtains an erroneous instruction,
thus

trapping

the trial

court

and

insuring

reversible

error

should the verdict be against him, each party to every lawsuit
could

attempt

likewise."

to hedge against

an adverse verdict

by doing

Settle v. State, 619 P.2d 387, 388 (Wyo. 1980).

See

also Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 668 (Wyo. 1985) (continued
vitality of Settle holding).
Other States have also held that they will not allow a
criminal defendant to complain on appeal about jury instructions
the defendant submitted to the court.

The appellate courts cite

the policy considerations against

"invited error".

State v.

Araqon,

293, 298

State v.

107

Idaho

358, 690 P.2d

(1984);

Tassler, 159 Ariz. 183, 765 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1989);
People v. Szloboda, 44 Colo. App. 164, 620 P.2d 36, 37 (1980).
-10-

While Utah has not addressed this issue in the context
of a criminal case, the Utah Supreme Court has held
rrtB H

I ! i el I

mi j s i •> 11II in < I P 111 n : a 1

I I iH

-

v;

i m i 11 \ i J

1 a 11 q u H (j e

instruction and the i nstruction given at trial "would

rat-

within the rule of invited error of which the defendan*
I
679 (192*

Straka v Voyles

; ,

See also Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,

2d 292, t ^ r,^

u

--»

^

instruction, no -- :

: .

12

* oot

ll t a~

w K ~- -:*:•* ff requested jury

'•

,

.

Mann v. Fairbourn,
1961 j

substantias ±y

uiy bame

ah

xnbtxuctxoa

fails

(complaint

because

of

about

invited

error).
Additionally, defendant materially misrepresents the
r »•-.-. •

=

it^-

delete;

1...;.

three

''I..'

-

paragraphs

-

. r~t .

COUrt

Appellant's

instructions and modified the first two paragraphs."
A|j],j'

• •

*

Defendant

ctuall}

submitted

two

ci notl :i I ng
proposed

proposed
(Brief of

of

the s : :i : t

Instructions

on

reasonable doubt and two proposed instructions on self defense.
(Ii

'I

I fin

>i |

HI | |

I|

| i i ,i |

ii ui i

<ii , s e

i lit- in!

paiii

mJ

11 u I

that a defendant is not entitled to multiple instructions on the
same issue.
v . Mi lie,

State v. Moore, 782 P 2d 49' 7, 500 (Utah 1989); State
6 (I I I i tl

Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1984)

':i '

See also State v.

error when trial court

Defendant repeatedly refers to the trial court as the author
of the reasonable doubt instruction thus creating the erroneous
impression that the trial court, not defendant, was the author
(Brief of ^~~ ***- i i no i n i A I D I O \
-11 -

gave instruction similar in substance to instruction proposed by
defendant).

Cf. State v. Mills, 94 N.M. 17, 606 P.2d 1111, 1113

(Ct. App. 1980) cert, denied 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980)
(defendant cannot complain if he submits multiple instructions on
an issue and the court gives one of the proposed instructions but
not the others).
Defendant

exacerbates

his

misrepresentation

by

attaching as addendums to his brief the reasonable doubt and
self-defense instructions given by the trial court as well as his
alternative instructions which were not given.

By doing so,

defendant portrays the false impression that the trial court
rejected

or rewrote his proposed

defense instructions.
authored

the

reasonable

doubt

and

self-

Defendant fails to mention that he also

reasonable

doubt

and

self-defense

instructions

actually given by the court.
For example, attached as Appendix "A" to this brief is
a reasonable doubt instruction requested by defendant (R. 59)(See
Appendix "A").
reasonable

doubt

Comparatively attached as Appendix
instruction

given

by

the

identical to Appendix "A" (R. 114)(See Appendix
Appendices

"C" and

"D" represent

a

M M

court,
M

B").

self-defense

B

is the

which

is

Likewise,
instruction

proposed by defendant and an identical instruction given by the
court (See Appendices "CM and

M

DM).

Because defendant requested

the instructions of which he now complains, this Court should not
consider defendant's claim.

-12-

DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY AND
SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS.
In any event, this Court should refuse to address the
merits of defendant

challenge to the jury instructions because
Kpei * 11 i ca 11 y o b ) e c I

he f ailed 11 J 11ine

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter t<>
which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. Notwithstanding a parties fall ure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice,
Utah R. Grim, F, 19(c).
Thn

Ufa!'! Supreme

'"'our!, has

held

that,

"RUie

19(c)

requires more than a general exception to the instructions,
requires that the matter excepted
s

; --• - •.

.- --*

M

*

>

State x , Cai.^. .

It

/round therefor be

•

j r 5 94

(I It a h

198£

. i another case, the Utah Supreme Court held that when no

ground^

to: the

ul

i n s t r u c t inn, n d i v n n

502,

I In

objection were stated or apparent from the text
State v

mvurred

Dumas, ' 72] IP", 2d

506 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) ,
present

case,

ronf eren

the

trial

court

I don i ill jerl i uns

The entire bench conference consists ul

heJd

a

bench

i mi I lin rei < n d .

th«:j following

exchange

between the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel.
T h e C o u r t : W o u l d t h e c l e r k p l e a s e l a k e t h e reiina in J fig
exhibits into the bailiff.
Anything else?

-13

Gentlemen, one other thing-while we have the record.
We have met in chambers,
we have discussed jury
instructions and exceptions have been made to jury
instructions prior to this time,
I believe that you
would now like to make those a part of the record; is
that correct?
Mr. Valdez [defense counsel]:

Yes, your honor.

Mr. MacDougall [prosecutor]:
excerptions, your honor.

The State would have no

Mr. Valdez:
It's my understanding we had made two
excerptions to jury instructions. And I can only see
one here.
But the first exception would be to the
instruction the court gave on reasonable doubt, and
I'll mark that as Exception #1 and provide that to the
court.
Basically it's a longer version of the
instruction the court gave and has more of a
clarification we believe and also contains some cites
of authority that we think supports our position.
The Court:
file.

I believe it is in the packet with the

Mr. Valdez: I believe it is. There should
exception, but I can't recall at this point
was.
Well, I guess that's it.
I can't
other exception. Was there one or two, do
Judge?

be one more
what it
recall the
you recall,

The Court: I recall you making them in chambers, but
we modified some of the exceptions.
Mr. Valdez: I think that's the only exception, so with
that we'll submit it.
The Court:

Very well, court will be in recess.

(T. 280-81).
As quoted

above, defendant's objection

to the jury

instruction on reasonable doubt was not "distinctly stated," nor
is any error apparent
Appendix "A").

from the text of the instruction

(See

Defense counsel did not give a reason for his

No transcript exists of this in-chambers conference, which is
evidently why the court allowed objections on the record at this
time.
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objection other than his explanation that his other proposed
instruction was longer and provided more "clarification" than the
instruction

given.

Indeed,

the

other

proposed

instruction

offered by defendant contains language similar to that rejected
by a majority of the Utah Supreme Court.

State v. Johnson, 774

P.2d 1141, 1148 (1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result,
joined by Durham and Zimmerman, JJ.). See also State v. Ireland,
773 P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989)(Stewart, J., dissenting).4
Regarding

defendant's

challenge

to the

self-defense

instruction, it is well established that absent a timely and
specific objection to a jury instruction in the trial court, a
defendant cannot raise a claim of instructional error on appeal
unless the error constitutes a "manifest injustice."
Utah R. Crim. P.
1983).

Rule 19(c),

See State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 n.4 (Utah 1986); State

v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987); State v. Parkin, 742
P.2d 715, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In the instant case, defense counsel did not object to
the

self-defense

instruction,

leaving

instead

the

clear

impression that he only objected to the instruction on reasonable
doubt when he stated, "I think that's the only exception, so with
that we'll submit it." (R. 180, p. 281). Recognizing his failure

Justice Stewart has criticized using the language "weighty
affairs of life" in defining reasonable doubt. Johnson, 774 P.2d
at 1148 (Stewart, J., concurring); Ireland, 773 P. 2d at 1381
(Stewart,
J.,
dissenting).
Defendant's
other
proposed
instruction used the language "weighty affairs of life" in
defining what the reasonable doubt standard was not. The State
considers this negative method of defining a distinction without
a difference.
-15-

to preserve his objection, defendant raises a claim of manifest
injustice in a footnote (See Brief of App. at 25 n.12).
Defendant's claim of manifest injustice is in the same
posture as a claim earlier rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
State v. Medina, 738 P. 2d 1021 (Utah 1987).

In Medina, defense

counsel affirmatively stated she had no objection to the given
jury instructions.

Ld. at 1023 •

The Medina Court refused to

find manifest injustice when defense counsel consciously agreed
to the instruction.

Id.

Likewise, in the present case, manifest

injustice cannot arise where defendant drafted and requested the
same jury instructions to which he now complains.

See State v.

Neher, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 771 P.2d 330, 332 (1989).
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of murder in the second degree and that he should
have

been

convicted

of

the

lesser

offense

of

manslaughter.

Defendant's contention is without merit.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, the
appellate

standard

of review is well-settled.

Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).

The Booker Court noted:

[W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury verdict
only when the evidence, so viewed,
is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted.
-16-

See State v.

State v. Petreef Utah, 659 P. 2d 443, 444
(1983); accord State v. McCardle, Utah, 652
P.2d 942, 945 (1982).
In reviewing the
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. It is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses . . . State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d
229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden,
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can be
reasonably made, our inquiry stops.
Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.
In the instant case, defendant was convicted of murder
in the second degree, which provides as follows:
76-5-203.

Murder in the second degree.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another; [or]
(b) intending to cause serious bodily harm to
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes the death of
another.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989).
Defendant was tried on the alternative theories of
subsections (a) and (b). In order to convict defendant the jury
had to find either that; (1) defendant intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Jerry Hermansen, or (2) while intending to
cause serious bodily injury to Hermansen, defendant committed an
act clearly dangerous to human life causing Hermansen's death (R.
115).
There is no dispute that defendant killed Hermansen.
In fact, defendant admitted killing Hermansen before trial, at
trial, and continues to admit doing so on appeal (T. 93, 199-200)
-17-

(See Brief of App. at 27).

The only question remaining is

whether defendant caused the death intentionally/ knowingly, or
while intending to cause serious bodily injury to Hermansen.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury
could have reasonably inferred defendant's guilt.

The evidence

showed that defendant had possession of Hermansen's weapon (T.
91, 119, 196, 197-98).

At some point, while Hermansen's back was

turned on defendant, defendant shot Hermansen twice.
140-42).

(T. 134-35,

Additionally, defendant fatally shot Hermansen in the

right side of the neck. (T. 137).

All three shots were fired

from more than fourteen inches away, which the pathologist could
determine

because

there

was

no

stippling

Hermansen's body or his clothes (T. 140).

or

tattooing

on

While only the side

shot to the neck was fatal, the other two shots were from behind
Hermansen.

A reasonable jury could determine that by firing at

Hermansen, defendant

intended

to kill, or at least to cause

serious bodily injury.
Defendant

asserts

that

he

"feared

for

his

life"

justifying a finding of guilt for th€* lesser included offense of
5
manslaughter (Brief of App. at 26).
However, as the Utah
Supreme
"Assuming

Court
that

noted
the

in

another

evidence

second

would

degree

support

a

murder

case,

conviction

for

To support his claim, defendant cites State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d
211 (Utah 1985) and State in re Gonzales, 545 P.2d 187 (Utah
1975). However, these cases are easily distinguished. In Knoll
the defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted
of manslaughter.
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 212.
In Gonzales, the
defendant was charged with manslaughter. Gonzales, 545 P.2d at
188. In this case, defendant was charged and convicted of second
degree murder.
-18-

manslaughter, the jury, who are the sole judges of the facts, did
not view the conflicting evidence that way."

State v. Russell,

733 P.2d 162# 169 (Utah 1987).
Defendant's own conduct could reasonably cause a juror
to disbelieve his version of the events.

Defendant wrapped the

murder weapon in a towel and sold it to his cocaine dealer, then
told police that he had thrown the gun in the Jordan River (R.
180, p. 55, 93).

He told Detective Bell that Hermansen had

attacked him with the knife, although another police officer had
discovered the knife folded in Hermansen's pocket (R. 180, p. 33,
91-92).

At trial, defendant admitted lying to the police, giving

the jury grounds to legitimately question defendant's veracity on
the witness stand (R. 180, p. 201-03).
As the Utah Supreme Court has previously stated, "The
jury were [sic] not obligated to accept as true defendant's own
version of the evidence nor his self-exculpating statements as to
his intentions and his conduct.

They were entitled to use their

own judgment as to what evidence they would believe and to draw
any reasonable inferences therefrom."
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1975).

State v. Schoenfeld, 545

See also State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,

231 (Utah 1980); Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375,
379,

412 P.2d

615, 618 (1966); Webb v. 01 in Mathieson Chem.

Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1959).

The basic

function of the jury is to weigh the conflicting evidence and
draw conclusions from it.
(Utah 1986).

State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782

Despite defendant's testimony to the contrary, the

jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant

-19-

committed the offense of second degree murder.

State v. Petree,

659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

( r—day

of August, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO.

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he
is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainty.

Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that

is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is

merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all
reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable

men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence
or the lack of the evidence in this case.

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTION NO.

u.

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainty.

Now, by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt

that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt

which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly
speculative possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is

that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it and obviates all reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a

doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain and it must
arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this case.

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that laws of Utah do not require a
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or
greater weight of the evidence, but merely to bring forward
some evidence which tends to show self-defense.

If the

defendant has done this in any fashion, and if such evidence is
believed by you to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
unlawfulness of the act of shooting at Mr. Jerry Hermansen, you
should find the defendant not guilty.

o
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APPENDIX D

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that laws of Utah do not require a
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or
greater weight of the evidence, but merely to bring forward
some evidence which tends to show self-defense.

If the

defendant has done this in any fashion, and if such evidence is
believed by you to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
unlawfulness of the act of shooting at Mr. Jerry Hermansen, you
should find the defendant not guilty.

